We study a class of distributed convex constrained optimization problems where a group of agents aim to minimize the sum of individual objective functions while each desires that any information about its objective function is kept private. We prove the impossibility of achieving differential privacy using strategies based on perturbing the inter-agent messages with noise when the underlying noise-free dynamics are asymptotically stable. This justifies our algorithmic solution based on the perturbation of individual functions with Laplace noise. To this end, we establish a general framework for differentially private handling of functional data. We further design post-processing steps that ensure the perturbed functions regain the smoothness and convexity properties of the original functions while preserving the differentially private guarantees of the functional perturbation step. This methodology allows us to use any distributed coordination algorithm to solve the optimization problem on the noisy functions. Finally, we explicitly bound the magnitude of the expected distance between the perturbed and true optimizers which leads to an upper bound on the privacy-accuracy tradeoff curve. Simulations illustrate our results.
e.g., [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] and references therein, designs and analyzes algorithms for distributed convex optimization both in discrete and continuous time as well as in deterministic and stochastic scenarios. While these works consider an ambitious suite of topics related to convergence and performance under various constraints imposed by real-world applications, privacy is an aspect generally absent in their treatment. The concept of differential privacy [7] , [8] was originally proposed for databases of individual records subject to public queries and has been extended to several areas thereafter. The recent work [9] provides a comprehensive recent account of this area. In machine learning, the problem of differentially private optimization has received attention, see, e.g., [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] , as an intermediate, usually centralized step for solving other learning or statistical tasks. The common paradigm is having the sensitive information correspond to the entries of a finite database of records or training data that usually constitute the parameters of an additive objective function. Threat models are varied, including releasing to the adversary the whole sequence of internal states of the optimization process or only the algorithm's final output. In [10] , the authors design a differentially private classifier by perturbing the objective function with a linear finite-dimensional function (hyper-plane). It is shown in [11] that this method also works in the presence of constraints and non-differentiable regularizers. Although this is sufficient to preserve the privacy of the underlying finite-dimensional parameter set (learning samples), it cannot keep the whole objective function private. The authors of [12] design a sensitivity-based differentially private algorithm for regression analysis which, instead of perturbing the optimal weight vector, perturbs the regression cost function by injecting noise into the coefficients of the quadratic truncation of its Taylor expansion. This truncation limits the functional space to the (finite-dimensional) space of quadratic functions. In [13] , the authors propose the addition of a sample path of a Gaussian random process to the objective function, but do not explore the generalization to arbitrary dimensions or ensure the smoothness and convexity of the resulting function. In general, the proposed algorithms are not distributed and neither designed for nor capable of preserving the privacy of infinite-dimensional objective functions. Furthermore, the work in this area does not rigorously study the effect of added noise on the global optimizer or on the smoothness and convexity properties of the objective functions. In addition to addressing these issues, the present treatment is applicable to scenarios where the sensitive information consists of elements of any separable Hilbert space, including (objective) functions coming from the (infinite-dimensional) L 2 space.
Of more relevance to our paper are recent works [17] [18] [19] that are focused on differentially private distributed optimization problems for multi-agent systems. These papers consider as private information, respectively, the objective functions, the optimization constraints, and the agents' states. The underlying commonality is the algorithm design approach based on the idea of message perturbation. This idea consists of adopting a standard distributed optimization algorithm and modifying it by having agents perturb the messages to their neighbors or a central coordinator with Laplace or Gaussian noise. This approach has the advantage of working with the original objective functions and thus is easy to implement. However, for fixed design parameters, the algorithm's output does not correspond to the true optimizer in the absence of noise, suggesting the presence of a steady-state accuracy error. This problem is addressed in [18] by terminating the algorithm after a finite number of steps and optimizing this number offline as a function of the desired level of privacy. Nevertheless, for any fixed level of privacy, there exists an amount of bias in the algorithm's output which is not due to the added noise but to the lack of asymptotic stability of the underlying noiseless dynamics. To address this issue, our approach explores the use of functional perturbation to achieve differential privacy. The concept of functional differential privacy combines the benefits of metrics and adjacency relations. The authors of [20] also employ metrics instead of binary adjacency relations in the context of differential privacy. This approach has the advantage that the difference between the probabilities of events corresponding to any pair of data sets is bounded by a function of the distance between the data sets, eliminating the need for the computation of conservative sensitivity bounds.
Statement of contributions:
We consider a group of agents that seek to minimize the sum of their individual objective functions over a communication network in a differentially private manner. Our first contribution is to show that coordination algorithms which rely on perturbing the agents' messages with noise cannot satisfy the requirements of differential privacy if the underlying noiseless dynamics are locally asymptotically stable. The presence of noise necessary to ensure differential privacy is known to affect the algorithm accuracy in solving the distributed convex optimization problem. However, this result explains why message-perturbing strategies incur additional inaccuracies that are present even if no noise is added. Our second contribution is motivated by the goal of guaranteeing that the algorithm accuracy is only affected by the presence of noise. We propose a general framework for functional differential privacy over Hilbert spaces and introduce a novel definition of adjacency using adjacency spaces. The latter notion is quite flexible and includes, as a special case, the conventional bounded-difference notion of adjacency. We carefully specify these adjacency spaces within the L 2 space such that the requirement of differential privacy can be satisfied with bounded perturbations. Our third contribution builds on these results on functional perturbation to design a class of distributed, differentially private coordination algorithms. We let each agent perturb its own objective function based on its desired level of privacy, and then the group uses any provably correct distributed coordination algorithm to optimize the sum of the individual per-turbed functions. Two challenges arise in successfully applying this strategy: the fact that the perturbed functions might lose the smoothness and convexity properties of the original functions and the need to characterize the effect of the added noise on the minimizer of the resulting problem. We address the first challenge using a cascade of smoothening and projection steps that maintain the differential privacy of the functional perturbation step. We address the second challenge by explicitly bounding the absolute expected deviation from the original optimizer using a novel Lipschitz characterization of the argmin map. By construction, the resulting coordination algorithm satisfies the requirement of recovering perfect accuracy in the absence of noise. Various simulations illustrate our results.
Organization: We introduce our notation and basic preliminaries in Section II and formulate the private distributed optimization problem in Section III. Section IV presents the rationale for our design strategy and Section V describes a general framework for functional differential privacy. We formulate our solution to the private distributed optimization problem in Section VI. We present simulations in Section VII and collect our conclusions and ideas for future work in Section VIII. Appendix A gathers our results on the Lipschitzness of the argmin map under suitable assumptions.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we introduce our notational conventions and some fundamental facts about Hilbert spaces and robust stability of discrete-time systems.
A. Notation
We use R, R > 0 , Z ≥0 , and N to denote the set of reals, positive reals, nonnegative integers, and positive integers, respectively. The space of scalar-and n-vector-valued infinite sequences are denoted by R N and (R n ) N , respectively. Given K ∈ N and an element η = {η(k)} ∞ k = 0 of R N or (R n ) N , we use the shorthand notation η K = {η(k)} K k = 0 . If the index of η starts at k = 1, with a slight abuse of notation we also denote {η(k)} K k =1 by η K . We denote by 2 ⊂ R N the space of square-summable infinite sequences. We use | · | p and · p for the p-norm in finite and infinite-dimensional normed vector spaces, respectively (we drop the index p for p = 2). We let B(c, r) denote the closed ball with center c and radius r in Euclidean space. For D ⊆ R d , D o denotes its interior and L 2 (D) and C 2 (D) denote the set of square-integrable measurable functions and the set of twice continuously differentiable functions over D, respectively. Throughout the paper, m(·) denotes the Lebesgue measure. If
Given any closed and convex subset S ⊆ H of a Hilbert space, we denote by proj S the orthogonal projection onto S.
We denote by K the set of strictly increasing continuous functions α : [0, ∞) → [0, ∞) such that α(0) = 0. A function α belongs to K ∞ if α ∈ K and lim r →∞ α(r) = ∞. We denote by KL the set of functions β :
is nondecreasing and con-tinuous and β(0, s) = 0 and, for each r ∈ [0, ∞), s → β(r, s) is monotonically decreasing with β(r, s) → 0 as s → ∞. A map M : X → Y between two normed vector spaces is K-
The (zero-mean) Laplace distribution with scale b ∈ R > 0 is a continuous distribution with probability density function
. We use η ∼ Lap(b) to denote a random variable η with Laplace distribution. It is easy to see that if η ∼ Lap(b), |η| has an exponential distribution with rate λ = 1 b . Similarly, we use the notation η ∼ N (μ, σ 2 ) when η is normally distributed with mean μ and variance σ 2 . The error function erf : R → R is defined as
. Given any random variable η and any convex function φ, Jensen's in-
B. Hilbert Spaces and Orthonormal Bases
We review some basic facts on Hilbert spaces and refer the reader to [21] for a comprehensive treatment. A Hilbert space H is a complete inner-product space. A set {e k } k ∈I ⊂ H is an orthonormal system if e k , e j = 0 for k = j and e k , e k = e k 2 = 1 for all k ∈ I. If, in addition, the set of linear combinations of {e k } k ∈I is dense in H, then {e k } k ∈I is an orthonormal basis. Here, I might be uncountable: however, if H is separable (i.e., it has a countable dense subset), then any orthonormal basis is countable. In this case, we have
h, e k e k for any h ∈ H. We define the coefficient sequence θ ∈ R N by θ k = h, e k for k ∈ N. Then, θ ∈ 2 and, by Parseval's identity, h H = θ 2 . For ease of notation, we define Φ : 2 → H to be the linear bijection that maps the coefficient sequence θ to h. For an arbitrary D ⊆ R d , L p (D) is a Hilbert space if and only if p = 2, and the inner product is the integral of the product of functions. Moreover, L 2 (D) is separable. In the remainder of the paper, we assume {e k } ∞ k =1 is an orthonormal basis for L 2 (D) and Φ : 2 → L 2 (D) is the corresponding linear bijection between coefficient sequences and functions.
C. Robust Stability of Discrete-Time Systems
We briefly present some definitions and results on robust stability of discrete-time systems following [22] . Given the vector field f : R n × R m → R n , consider the system
with state x : Z ≥0 → R n and input η : Z ≥0 → R m . Given an equilibrium point x * ∈ R n of the unforced system, we say that (1) is 1) 0-input locally asymptotically stable (0-LAS) relative to x * if, by setting η = 0, there exists ρ > 0 and γ ∈ KL such that, for every initial condition
2) locally input-to-state stable (LISS) relative to x * if there exist ρ > 0, γ ∈ KL, and κ ∈ K such that, for every initial condition x(0) ∈ B(x * , ρ) and every input satisfying η ∞ ≤ ρ, we have
for all k ∈ N. In this case, we refer to ρ as the robust stability radius of (1) relative to x * . By definition, if the system (1) is LISS, then it is also 0-LAS. The converse is also true, cf. [22, Theorem 1]. The following result is a local version of [23, Lemma 3.8] and states an important asymptotic behavior of LISS systems.
Proposition II.1 (Asymptotic gain of LISS systems): Assume system (1) is LISS relative to x * with associated robust stability radius ρ. If
Proof: From (2), we have
where we have used x(0) ∈ B(x * , ρ). Now, for each k ∈ N, let η [k ] ∈ (R n ) N be defined by η [k ] ( ) = η(k + ) for all ∈ Z ≥0 . If there exists k 0 such that η [k 0 ] ∞ = 0, then we need to show that lim k →∞ |x(k) − x * | = 0. Since γ ∈ KL, there exists K ∈ Z ≥0 such that γ(ρ, k) ≤ ρ for all k ≥ K, and since κ( η ∞ ) ≤ ρ as well, it follows from (3) that x(k) ∈ B(x * , ρ) for all k ≥ K.
Let k = max{k 0 , K}. Using (2), we get
and the result follows. Assume then that no k 0 exists such that η [k 0 ] ∞ = 0. Let K 0 = 0 and, for each j ∈ N,
The result follows by taking limit of both sides as j → ∞.
III. PROBLEM STATEMENT
Consider a group of n agents whose communication topology is described by a digraph G. Each agent i ∈ {1, . . . , n} has a local objective function f i : D → R, where D ⊂ R d is convex and compact and has nonempty interior. We assume that each f i , i ∈ {1, . . . , n} is convex and twice continuously differentiable, and use the shorthand notation F = {f i } n i = 1 . Consider the following convex optimization problem:
The optimization problem can be equivalently written as,
We assume that X is a global piece of information known to all agents. The group objective is to solve the convex optimization problem (4) in a distributed and private way. By distributed, we mean that each agent can only interact with its neighbors in G. For privacy, we consider the case where the function f i (or some of its attributes) constitute the local and sensitive information known to agent i ∈ {1, . . . , n} that has to be kept confidential. Each agent assumes (the worst-case where) the adversary has access to all the "external" information (including all the network communications and all other objective functions). This setting is sometimes called local (differential) privacy in the literature, see e.g., [24] . In order to define privacy, we first introduce the notion of adjacency. Given any normed vector space
The set V is a design choice that we specify later in Section V-B. Moreover, this definition can be readily extended to the case where V is any subset of another normed vector space W ⊆ L 2 (D). With this generalization, the conventional bounded-difference notion of adjacency becomes a special case of the definition above, where V is a closed ball around the origin. We provide next a general definition of differential privacy for a map.
Definition III.1 (Differential Privacy): Let (Ω, Σ, P ) be a probability space and consider a random map
from the function space L 2 (D) n to an arbitrary set X . Given ∈ R n > 0 , the map M is -differentially private if, for any two V-adjacent sets of functions F and F that (at most) differ in their i 0 'th element and any set O ⊆ X , one has
Essentially, this notion requires the statistics of the output of M to change only (relatively) slightly if the objective function of one agent changes (and the change is in V), making it hard for an adversary who observes the output of M to determine the change. In the case of an iterative asymptotic distributed optimization algorithm, M represents the action (observed by the adversary) of the algorithm on the set of local functions F . In other words, M is the map (parameterized by the initial network condition) that assigns to F the whole sequence of messages transmitted over the network. In this case, (5) has to hold for all allowable initial conditions. We are ready to formally state the network objective. Problem 1: (Differentially private distributed optimization): Design a distributed and differentially private optimization algorithm whose guarantee on accuracy improves as the level of privacy decreases, leading to the exact optimizer of the aggregate objective function in the absence of privacy.
The reason for the requirement of recovering the exact optimizer in the absence of privacy in Problem 1 is the following. It is well-known in the literature of differential privacy that there always exists a cost for an algorithm to be differentially private, i.e., the algorithm inevitably suffers a performance loss that increases as the level of privacy increases. This phenomenon is a result of the noise added in the map M, whose variance increases as decreases. With the above requirement on the noise-free behavior of the algorithm, we aim to make sure that the cause of this performance loss is only due to the added noise and not to any other factor.
Example III.2 (Linear Classification with Logistic Loss Function):
We introduce here a supervised classification problem that will serve to illustrate the discussion along the paper. Consider a database of training records composed of the labeled samples {(a i , b i )} N i = 1 , where each a i ∈ R d (containing the features of a corresponding object) may belong to one of two possible classes and b i ∈ {−1, 1} determines to which class it belongs. The goal is to train a classifier with the samples so that it can automatically classify future unlabeled samples. For simplicity, we let d = 2 and assume a i ∈ [0, 1] 2 and b i ∈ {−1, 1} are independently and uniformly randomly selected. The aim is to find the best hyperplane x T a that can separate the two classes. The parameters x defining the hyperplane can be found by solving the convex problem
where :
is the loss function and (λ/2)|x| 2 is the regularizing term. Since the objective function is strongly convex, we choose X large enough so that x * is the same as the unique unconstrained minimizer. Popular choices of are the logistic loss (x; a i , b i ) = ln(1 + e −b i a T i x ) and the hinge loss (x; a i , b i ) = max{0, 1 − b i a T i x}. We focus on the logistic loss here due to its smoothness.
Consider a group of n agents, each one owning a portion N d = N/n of the training samples, who seek to collectively solve (6) in a distributed fashion, i.e., only by communicating with their neighbors (without a central aggregator). Various iterative algorithms have been proposed in the literature, cf. [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] , to address this problem. As an example, [2] proposes that each agent i ∈ {1, . . . , n} starts with an initial estimate x i (0) of x * and, at each iteration k, updates its estimate as
where {a ij } n j = 1 are the edge weights of the communication graph at node i and α k is the stepsize. From (7b), one can see that agents only need to share their estimates with their neighbors to run the algorithm. Under reasonable connectivity assumptions, one can show [2] that x i (k) converges to x * asymptotically if the sequence of stepsizes is square-summable ( k α 2 k < ∞) but not summable ( k α k = ∞). In this paper, we are interested in endowing distributed coordination algorithms such as this with privacy guarantees so that their execution does not reveal information about the local objective functions to the adversary.
IV. RATIONALE FOR DESIGN STRATEGY
In this section, we discuss two algorithm design strategies to solve Problem 1 based on the perturbation of either interagent messages or the local objective functions. We point out an important limitation of the former, and this provides justification for the ensuing design of our objective-perturbing algorithm based on functional differential privacy.
A. Limitations of Message-Perturbing Strategies
We use the term message-perturbing strategy to refer to the result of modifying any of the distributed optimization algorithms available in the literature by adding (Gaussian or Laplace) noise to the messages agents send to either neighbors or a central aggregator in order to preserve privacy. A generic messageperturbing distributed algorithm takes the form
where ξ, η : Z ≥0 → R n are the sequences of messages and perturbations, respectively, and a I : R n × R n → R n depends on the agents' sensitive information set I with associated optimizer x * I . This formulation is quite general and can also encode algorithmic solutions for optimization problems other than the one in Section III, such as the ones studied in [18] , [19] . In the problem of interest here, I = F = {f i } n i = 1 . The following result provides conditions on the noise variance that ensure that the noise vanishes asymptotically almost surely and remains bounded with nonzero probability.
Lemma IV.1 (Convergence and boundedness of Laplace and normal random sequences with decaying variance): Let η be a sequence of independent random variables defined over
Given r > 0, consider the events
Proof: First, consider the case where η(k) ∼ Lap(b(k)). By the independence of the random variables and the fact that |η(k)| is exponentially distributed with rate 1 b(k ) ,
.
By assumption, b(k) ≤ c k p for all k ∈ N and some p, c > 0. Thus, given that the series ∞ k =1 e − r c k p converges [25, §1.14] ,
is a monotonically decreasing sequence that converges to zero as → ∞ (e.g., υ = 1 ). Note that
For the case of normal distribution of random variables,
and the results follows from the arguments above. Note that Lemma IV.1 also ensures that the probability that the noise simultaneously converges to zero and remains bounded is nonzero. One might expect that Lemma IV.1 would hold if b(k) → 0 at any rate. However, this is not true. For instance, if b(k) = 1 log k , one can show that the probability that η(k) eventually remains bounded is zero for any bound r ≤ 1, so the probability that η(k) → 0 is zero as well.
The following result shows that a message-perturbing algorithm of the form (8) cannot achieve differential privacy if the underlying (noise-free) dynamics are asymptotically stable. For convenience, we employ the short-hand notatioñ a I (x(k), η(k)) = a I (x(k), x(k) + η(k)) to refer to (8) .
Proposition IV.2 (Impossibility result for 0-LAS messageperturbing algorithms): Consider any algorithm of the form (8) with either η i (k) ∼ Lap(b i (k)) or η i (k) ∼ N (0, b i (k)). Ifã I is 0-LAS relative to x * I for two information sets I and I with different optimizers x * I = x * I and associated robust stability radii ρ and ρ , respectively, b i (k) is O( 1 k p ) for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and some p > 0, and at least one of the following holds:
i) x * I is not an equilibrium point of
then, the algorithm cannot preserve the -differential privacy of the information set I for any > 0. Proof: Our proof strategy consists of establishing that, if the initial state is close to the equilibrium of the system for one information set, the state trajectory converges to that equilibrium with positive probability but to the equilibrium of the system with the other information set with probability zero. We then use this fact to rule out differential privacy. For any fixed initial state x 0 , if either of ξ or η is known, the other one can be uniquely determined from (8) . Therefore, the mapping Ξ I,
is well-defined and bijective. Let κ, κ ∈ K be as in (2) corresponding toã I andã I , respectively. Consider as initial condition x 0 = x * I and define
where we are using the forward and inverse images of sets, respectively). Next, we show that no η ∈ R converges to 0 under either hypothesis (i) or (ii) of the statement. Under (i), there exists a neighborhood of (x * I , 0) ∈ R 2n in which the infimum of the absolute value of at least one of the components ofã I (x, η) is positive, so whenever (x, η) enters this neighborhood, it exits it in finite time. Therefore, given that any x ∈ O converges to x * I , no η ∈ R can converge to zero. Under (ii), there exists a neighborhood of x * I included in B(x * I , ρ ). Since Ξ I ,x 0 (η ) → x * I , there exists K ∈ N such that Ξ I ,x 0 (η )(k) belongs to B(x * I , ρ ) for all k ≥ K. Therefore, if |η (k)| ≤ min (κ ) −1 (ρ ), ρ indefinitely after any point of time, Ξ I ,x 0 (η ) → x * I by Proposition II.1 which is a contradiction, so η cannot converge to zero. In both cases, by Lemma IV.1, P (R ) = 0, which, together with P (R) > 0 and the definition of -differential privacy, cf. (5), implies the result.
Note that the hypotheses of Proposition IV.2 are mild and easily satisfied in most cases. In particular, the result holds if the dynamics are continuous and globally asymptotically stable relative to x * I for two information sets. The main takeaway message of this result is that a globally asymptotically stable distributed optimization algorithm cannot be made differentially private by perturbing the inter-agent messages with asymptotically vanishing noise. This observation is at the core of the design choices made in the literature regarding the use of stepsizes with finite sum to make the zero-input dynamics not asymptotically stable, thereby causing a steady-state error in accuracy which is present independently of the amount of noise injected for privacy. For instance, the algorithmic solution proposed in [17] replaces (7b) by z i (k) = n j = 1 a ij ξ j (k), where ξ j (k) = x j (k) + η j (k) is the perturbed message received from agent j, and chooses a finite-sum sequence of stepsizes {α k } in the computation (7a), leading to a dynamical system which is Fig. 1 . Privacy-accuracy tradeoff for the algorithm proposed in [17] applied to Example III.2 with D = X = [−5, 5] 2 , n = 10, N d = 100, and λ = 0.01. With that paper's notation, we set q = 0.1, p = 0.11, c = 0.5. The stepsize α k = cq k − 1 has finite sum. The circles, dotted line, and solid line illustrate simulation results for 50 executions, their best linear fit in logarithmic scale, and the upper bound on accuracy provided in [17] , respectively. We have broken the vertical axis to better display the scale of the algorithm output. not 0-GAS, see Fig. 1 . Similar observations can be made in the scenario considered in [18] , where the agents' local constraints are the sensitive information (instead of the objective function). This algorithmic solution uses a constant-variance noise, which would make the dynamics unstable if executed over an infinite time horizon. This problem is circumvented by having the algorithm terminate after a finite number of steps, and optimizing this number offline as a function of the desired level of privacy .
B. Algorithm Design via Objective Perturbation
To overcome the limitations of message-perturbing strategies, here we outline an alternative design strategy to solve Problem 1 based on the perturbation of the agents' objective functions. The basic idea is to have agents independently perturb their objective functions in a differentially private way and then have them participate in a distributed optimization algorithm with the perturbed objective functions instead of their original ones. In the context of Example III.2, this would correspond to leaving (7b) and the sequence of stepsizes unchanged, and instead using perturbed functions in the computation (7a). The latter in turn automatically adds noise to the estimates shared with neighbors. The following result, which is a special case of [26, Theorem 1], ensures that the combination with the distributed optimization algorithm does not affect the differential privacy at the functional level.
Proposition IV.3 (Resilience to post-processing): Let M : L 2 (D) n × Ω → L 2 (D) n be -differentially private (cf. Definition III.1) and F : L 2 (D) n → X , where (X , Σ X ) is an arbitrary measurable space. Then, F • M : L 2 (D) n × Ω → X is -differentially private. Proof: First, note that although a slightly different definition of differential privacy is used in [26] , the exact same proof of [26, Theorem 1] works with Definition III.1. Consider the σalgebra P(L 2 (D) n ) on L 2 (D) n , where P denotes the power set. With the notation of [26, Theorem 1], M 2 = F • M is a deterministic function of the output of M 1 = M. Then, it is easy to verify that, for any S ∈ Σ X P (M 2 (F ) ∈ S | M 1 (F )) = χ S (F(M 1 (F ))) (with χ · being the indicator function) is measurable as a function of M 1 (F ) (because F and S are trivially measurable) and defines a probability measure on (X , Σ X ) (associated to a singleton), so it is a probability kernel. Hence, the conditions of [26, Theorem 1] are satisfied and F • M is -differentially private.
Our design strategy based on the perturbation of individual objective functions requires solving the following challenges: i) establishing a differentially private procedure to perturb the individual objective functions; ii) ensuring that the resulting perturbed functions enjoy the smoothness and regularity properties required by distributed optimization algorithms to converge; iii) with (i) and (ii) in place, characterizing the accuracy of the resulting differentially private, distributed coordination algorithm. Section V addresses (i) and Section VI deals with (ii) and (iii).
V. FUNCTIONAL DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY
We explore here the concept of functional differential privacy to address the challenge (i) laid out in Section IV-B. The generality of this notion makes it amenable for problems where the sensitive information is a function or some of its attributes (e.g., sample points, optimizers, derivatives and integrals). For simplicity of exposition and without loss of generality, we limit our discussion in this section to the privacy of a single function.
A. Functional Perturbation via Laplace Noise
Let f ∈ L 2 (D) be a function whose differential privacy has to be preserved. With the notation of Section II, we decompose f into its coefficients Φ −1 (f ) and perturb this sequence by adding noise to all of its elements. Specifically, we set
where
for all k ∈ N. Clearly, for η to belong to 2 and for the series in Φ(η) to converge, the scales {b k } ∞ k =1 cannot be arbitrary. The next result addresses this issue.
Lemma V.1 (Sufficient condition for boundedness of perturbed functions): If there exists K ∈ N such that, for some p > 1 2 and s > 1
then η defined by (10) belongs to 2 with probability one. In particular, if for some p > 1 2 and γ > 0
then η defined by (10) belongs to 2 with probability one.
Proof: Equation (11) can be equivalently written as e
converges (i.e., the limit exists and is nonzero), so
and we have used the fact that |η k | is exponentially distributed with rate
as stated. If (12) holds, we definep = 1 2 (p + 1 2 ) and equivalently write (12) as
Since p −p > 0, for any s > 1 there exists K ∈ N such that k p−p ≥ γ log k s for all k ≥ K, and the result follows.
Having established conditions on the noise variance under which the map (9) is well defined, we next turn our attention to establish its differential privacy.
B. Differential Privacy of Functional Perturbation
Here, we establish the differential privacy of the map (9) . In order to do so, we first specify our choice of adjacency space V. Given q > 1, consider the weight sequence {k q } ∞ k =1 and define the adjacency vector space to be the image of the resulting weighted 2 space under Φ, i.e.,
It is not difficult to see that V q is a vector space. Moreover,
is a norm on V q . The next result establishes the differential privacy of (9) for a properly chosen noise scale sequence b. Theorem V.2 (Differential privacy of functional perturbation): Given q > 1, γ > 0 and p ∈ 1
Then, the map (9) is -differentially private with
where ζ is the Riemann zeta function. Proof: Note that the map M defined by (9) is well defined because (14) ensures, by Lemma V.1, that η belongs to 2 almost surely. Our proof consists of showing that M satisfies the definition of differential privacy, cf. Definition III.1. To this effect, consider two functions f and f , with f − f ∈ V q , and an arbitrary set O ⊆ L 2 (D). Let Φ −1 K : L 2 (D) → R K be the map that returns the first K coefficients of Φ −1 (·) and
We have 
Note that
After multiplying both sides by L K (η K ; b K ), integrating over
Finally, the coefficient of the exponential can be upper bounded using Holder's inequality with p = q = 2 as
which completes the proof.
Remark V.3 (Choice of q):
The choice of parameter q affects the tradeoff between the size of the adjacency space V q and the noise required for privacy. From (13) , we see that decreasing q makes V q larger, allowing for the privacy preservation of a larger collection of functions. However, as expected, preserving privacy in a larger space requires more noise. From (12) , γ will be larger for a fixed , (since p cannot be decreased by the same amount as q and ζ is monotonically decreasing), resulting in larger b k and larger noise. We show later in Theorem VI.2 that the guaranteed upper bound on the expected minimizer deviation also increases as {q i } n i = 1 decrease.
VI. DIFFERENTIALLY PRIVATE DISTRIBUTED OPTIMIZATION
In this section, we employ functional differential privacy to solve the differentially private distributed optimization problem formulated in Section III for a group of n ∈ N agents. For convenience, we introduce the shorthand notation S 0 = C 2 (D) ⊂ L 2 (D) and, for given u > 0, 0 < α < β,
for twice continuously differentiable functions with bounded gradients and Hessians. In the rest of the paper, we assume that the agents' local objective functions f 1 , . . . , f n belong to S.
A. Smoothness and Regularity of the Perturbed Functions
We address here the challenge (ii) laid out in Section IV-B. To exploit the framework of functional differential privacy for optimization, we need to ensure that the perturbed functions have the smoothness and regularity properties required by the distributed coordination algorithm. In general, the output of (9) might neither be smooth nor convex. We detail next how to address these problems by defining appropriate maps that, when composed with M in (9), yield functions with the desired properties. Proposition IV.3 ensures that differential privacy is retained throughout this procedure.
1) Ensuring Smoothness:
To ensure smoothness, we rely on the fact that S 0 is dense in L 2 (D) and, therefore, given any function g in L 2 (D), there exists a smooth function arbitrarily close to it, i.e., ∀ε > 0, ∃ĝ s ∈ S 0 such that g −ĝ s < ε.
Here, ε is a design parameter and can be chosen sufficiently small (later, we show how to do this so that the accuracy of the coordination algorithm is not affected).
Remark VI.1 (Smoothening and Truncation):
A natural choice for the smoothening step, if the basis functions are smooth (i.e., {e k } ∞ k =1 ⊂ S 0 ), is truncating the infinite expansion of g. Such truncation is also inevitable in practical implementations due to the impossibility of handling infinite series. The appropriate truncation order depends on the specific function, the basis set, and the noise decay rate (p in (14)).
2) Ensuring Strong Convexity and Bounded Hessian: The next result ensures that the orthogonal projection from S 0 onto S is well defined, and can therefore be used to ensure strong convexity and bounded Hessian of the perturbed functions.
Proposition VI.2 (Convexity of S and its closedness relative to S 0 ): The set S is convex and closed as a subset of S 0 under the 2-norm.
Proof: The set S is clearly convex because, if h 1 , h 2 ∈ S and λ ∈ [0, 1], then for all x ∈ D o
for all x ∈ D. To establish closedness, let
Since S = S 1 ∩ S 2 , it is enough to show that S 1 and S 2 are both closed subsets of S 0 .
To show that S 1 is closed, let {h k } ∞ k =1 be a sequence of functions in S 1 such that h k
Since h k − α 2 |x| 2 · 2 − − → h − α 2 |x| 2 and L 2 convergence implies pointwise convergence of a subsequence almost everywhere,
The proof of closedness of S 2 is more involved. By contradiction, assume that
Therefore, there exist x 0 ∈ D o such that |∇h(x 0 )| > u and, by continuity of ∇h, δ 0 > 0 and υ 0 > 0 such that
|∇h(x 0 )| . By continuity of ∇h, for all υ 1 > 0 there exists δ 1 ∈ (0, δ 0 ] such that ∇h(x) · u 0 ≥ (1 − υ 1 )|∇h(x)|, ∀x ∈ B(x 0 , δ 1 ).
As mentioned above, L 2 convergence implies pointwise convergence of a subsequence {h k } ∞ =1 almost everywhere. In turn, this subsequence converges to h almost uniformly, i.e., for all υ 2 > 0 and all υ 3 > 0, there exist E ⊂ D and L ∈ N such that m(E) < υ 2 and
For ease of notation, let δ 2 = δ 1 /2. Using the fundamental theorem of line integrals [29] , for all
Similarly, for all x ∈ B(x 0 , δ 2 ) \ E and all ∈ N
Putting (17), (18) , and (16) together and choosing υ 3 = υ 1 δ 2 u, we have for all x ∈ B(x 0 , δ 2 ) \ E and all ≥ L
The quantity υ 4 can be made strictly positive choosing υ 1 = υ 0 4u +3υ 0 > 0. Let E + = E + δ 2 u 0 and x 1 = x 0 + δ 2 u 0 . Then, (19) can be rewritten as
This contradicts h k · 2 − − → h, so S 2 must be closed. Given the result in Proposition VI.2, the best approximation in S of a function h ∈ S 0 is its unique projection onto S, i.e., h = proj S (h).
By definition,h has bounded gradient and Hessian.
B. Algorithm Design and Analysis
We address here the challenge (iii) laid out in Section IV-B and put together the discussion above to propose a class of differentially private, distributed optimization algorithms that solve Problem 1. Unlike the message-perturbing algorithms where agents use the original objective functions in the computations and rely on perturbing the inter-agent messages, here we propose that agents locally perturb their objective functions and use them in their computations, without adding any additional noise to the inter-agent messages. Therefore, we require each agent i ∈ {1, . . . , n} to first computê
where η i is a sequence of Laplace noise generated by i according to (10) with the choice (14), then selectf s i ∈ S 0 such that
and finally computef
After this process, agents participate in any distributed optimization algorithm with the modified objective functions {f i } n i = 1 . Letx * = argmin Theorem VI.3 (Accuracy of the proposed class of distributed, differentially private coordination algorithms): Consider a group of n agents who perturb their local objective functions according to (20) with Laplace noise (10) of variance (14) , where q i > 1, γ i > 0, and p i ∈ 1 2 , q i − 1 2 for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Let the agents participate in any distributed coordination algorithm that asymptotically converges to the optimizerx * of the perturbed aggregate objective function. Then, i -differential privacy of each agent i's original objective function is preserved
where the function κ n ≡ κ nα,nβ ∈ K ∞ is defined in Proposition A.2.
Proof: Since the distributed algorithm is a post-processing step on the perturbed functions, privacy preservation of the objective functions follows from Theorem V.2 and Proposition IV.3. For convenience, let
Since μ nα,nβ is convex and belongs to class K ∞ (so is monotonically increasing), κ n is concave and belongs to class K ∞ and so is subadditive. Therefore, using Proposition A.2
Then, by the non-expansiveness of projection, we have
By invoking Jensen's inequality twice, for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}
The result follows from (21) and (22) . The following result describes the tradeoff between accuracy and privacy. The proof follows by direct substitution.
Corollary VI.4 (Privacy-accuracy tradeoff):
Under the hypotheses of Theorem VI.3, if p i = q i 2 in (14) for all i, then
In Corollary VI.4, q i and i are chosen independently, which in turn determines the value of γ i according to (15) . Also, it is clear from (23) that in order for the accuracy of the coordination algorithm not to be affected by the smoothening step, each agent i ∈ {1, . . . , n} has to take the value of ε i sufficiently small so that it is negligible relative to ζ(2p i )/ i . In particular, this procedure can be executed for any arbitrarily large value of i , so that in the case of no privacy requirements at all, perfect accuracy is recovered, as specified in Problem 1.
Remark VI.5 (Accuracy bound for sufficiently large domains): One can obtain a less conservative bound than (23) on the accuracy of the proposed class of algorithms if the minimizers of all the agents' objective functions are sufficiently far from the boundary of D and in the interior of X (this can be made precise via Corollary A.3). If the aggregate objective function satisfies (28) and the amount of noise is also sufficiently small so that the minimizer of the sum of the perturbed objective functions satisfies this condition, then invoking Corollary A.3, we have
where the equality holds under the assumption that p i = q i 2 in (14) for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
VII. SIMULATIONS
In this section, we report simulation results of our algorithm for Example III.2 with D = X = [−5, 5] 2 , n = 10, N d = 100, and λ = 0.01. The orthonormal basis of L 2 (D) is constructed from the Gram-Schmidt orthogonalization of the Taylor functions and the series is truncated to the second, sixth, and fourteenth orders, resulting in 15-, 28-, and 120-dimensional coefficient spaces, respectively. This truncation also acts as the smoothening step described in Section VI-A1, where higher truncation orders result in smaller ε. We evaluate the projection operator in (20c) by numerically solving the convex optimization problem minf where r D = 5. Rather than implementing any specific distributed coordination algorithm, we use an iterative interior-point algorithm onf and f to find the perturbedx * and original x * optimizers, respectively (these points correspond to the asymptotic behavior of any provably correct distributed optimization algorithm with the perturbed and original functions, respectively).
The privacy levels are chosen the same for all agents, i.e., = ( , , · · · , ), and is swept logarithmically over [10 −2 , 10 3 ]. For each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, we set q i = 2p i = 1.1 and γ i = ζ(2(q i − p i ))/ . For each value of and truncation order, the simulations are repeated 20 times to capture the stochasticity of the solutions. Fig. 2 illustrates the error |x * − x * | as a function of for different truncation orders, together with the best linear fit of log |x * − x * | against log , and the upper bound obtained in Corollary VI.4. The conservative nature of this upper bound can be explained by noting the approximations leading to the computation of κ n in Proposition A.2, suggesting that there is room for refining this bound. Fig. 2 shows that accuracy keeps improving as the privacy requirement is relaxed until the ε-term (resulting from the smoothening/truncation) dominates the error. This "saturation" value can be decreased by increasing the truncation order (which comes at the expense of more computational complexity), in contrast with the behavior of message-perturbing algorithms, cf. Fig. 1 . It is important to mention that the respective error values for a fixed cannot be compared between Figs. 1 and 2 because, in [17] , is defined as the total exponent in (5), i.e., i 0 f i 0 − f i 0 V . However, it can be seen that the accuracy in Fig. 1 is almost indifferent to the value of and is in the same order as r D = 5. This is explained by the impossibility result of Proposition IV.2: since the noisefree algorithm of [17] is not asymptotically stable, depending on the specific application, its accuracy may not be desirable regardless of the value of . In contrast, the accuracy in Fig. 2 keeps improving as is increased (with an appropriate choice of truncation order).
VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
We have studied the distributed optimization of the sum of local strongly convex objective functions by a group of agents subject to the requirement of differential privacy. We have established the incompatibility between differential privacy and the asymptotic stability of the underlying (noise-free) dynamics for coordination strategies based on the perturbation of the messages among agents. This has motivated us to develop a new framework for differentially private release of functions from the L 2 space that can be applied to arbitrary separable Hilbert spaces. We have also carefully described how perturbed functions with the desired regularity requirements can be provided to any distributed coordination algorithm while preserving privacy. Finally, we upper bounded the accuracy of the resulting class of distributed, differentially private coordination algorithms. Future work will analyze how to relax the smoothness and convexity assumptions on the local objective functions and the compactness hypothesis on their domains, characterize the optimal privacy-accuracy tradeoff curve of distributed coordination algorithms based on objective perturbation, characterize the expected suboptimality gap of distributed coordination algorithms for a given desired level of privacy, provide procedures for choosing the truncation order of the functional expansion based on the objective function properties (which must itself be differentially private), compare the numerical efficiency of different orthonormal bases for the L 2 space, and further understand the appropriate scale of the privacy parameter for specific application domains.
APPENDIX A K-LIPSCHITZ PROPERTY OF THE ARGMIN MAP
Here, we establish the Lipschitzness of the argmin map under suitable assumptions. This is a strong result of independent interest given that argmin is not even continuous for arbitrary C 2 functions. Our accuracy analysis for the proposed class of distributed, differentially private algorithms in Section VI-B relies on this result. We begin with a lemma stating a geometric property of balls contained in convex, compact domains.
Lemma A.1 (Minimum portion of balls contained in convex compact domains): Assume D ⊂ R d is convex, compact, and has nonempty interior and let r D > 0 denote its inradius. Then, there exists λ D ∈ (0, 1) such that,
m(B(x, r) ∩ D) ≥ λ D m(B(x, r))
for any x ∈ D and r ≤ r D .
Proof: Let B(c D , r D ) be the inball of D, i.e., the largest ball contained in D. If this ball is not unique, we pick one arbitrarily. Since D o = ∅, r D > 0. Let R D be the radius of the largest ball centered at c D that contains D. Since D is compact, R D < ∞. For any x ∈ D that is on or outside of B(c D , r D ), let Σ be the intersection of B(c D , r D ) and the hyperplane passing through c D and perpendicular to c D − x. Consider the cone C = conv(Σ ∪ {x}) where conv denotes convex hull. Since D is convex, C ⊆ D. Note that C has half angle θ x = tan −1 r D |x−c D | so the solid angle at its apex is
Therefore, for any r ≤ r D , the proportion Ω θ x Ω d of B(x, r) is contained in D where Ω d = 2π where L = d(d + 2)(d + 4)(β − α) d + 2 Γ(d/2) 4(αβ) d/2+2 π d/2 .
Proof: The proof follows in the same lines as the proof of Proposition A.2 (and we use here the same notation). Since the minimizers of f and g lie in the interior of X, u a = u b = 0. The main difference here is that due to (28) , we have for all x ∈ B(c, r) that ). To explicitly calculate the value of the resulting integral, one can use the change of variables x i = c i + ry 1/2 i , i ∈ {1, . . . , d} and then use the formula ∀a i > −1, S d y a 1 1 · · · y a d d dy = Γ(a 1 + 1) · · · Γ(a d + 1) Γ(a 1 + · · · + a d + d + 1)
where S d = {y ∈ R d | d i=1 y i = 1 and y i ≥ 0, i ∈ {1, . . . , d}}. The result then follows from straightforward simplifications of the integral.
